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SECTION 202 OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW
-PER SE RULES FOR STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
The identity of the shareholder is of concern to many corporations, par-
ticularly close corporations. These corporations are small companies that have
incorporated in order to obtain limited liability and other advantages of the
corporate form, but which are managed as if they were sole proprietorships or
partnerships? The shareholders take an active part in management and, of ne-
cessity, must work closely with each other. 2 Also, profits may be distributed
in the form of salaries which reflect services rendered the corporation, and are
not subject to double taxation as are dividends.2 An outsider who desires to
become a part owner in these corporations may create a number of problems.
The corporate organization may require that the stockholder take an active
part in management, but the other active shareholders will desire the opportu-
nity to select the individuals with whom they must work in managing the cor-
poration.4 If, on the other hand, the securities are purchased for investment,
there will be a conflict with the practice of shareholder participation in man-
agement and of the distribution of profits as salaries rather than as divi-
dends. Finally, if, in either case, the sale will increase the number of share-
holders, there may be a conflict with the corporation's desire to limit that
number since the number of shareholders may be determinative of whether the
corporation is a "close corporation" entitled to special privileges under the
applicable corporation 8 or tax laws.e
Although the selection of shareholders is primarily the concern of close
corporations, other types of corporations may, because of the particular na-
ture of their business, desire this control. The members of a cooperative apart-
ment building will desire to have some control over the selection of those who
will become tenants by purchasing the organization's shares? A corporation
supplying local services may wish to keep ownership within the community.8
Similarly, a corporation may use employee ownership to attract personnel or
to create an interest among the employees in the corporation and, therefore,
1 F. O'Neal & J. Derwin, Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates § 2.10,
at 23 (1961).
2 See Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517, 522, 149 N.W. 754, 756
(1914) ; O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning
and Drafting, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 773 (1952).
3 F. O'Neal & J. Derwin, supra note 1, § 2.03, at 13.
4 The right of shareholders to select their associates has long been established. See
Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902).
5 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 342(a) (1) (Corporation Trust Co., General Corpora-
tion Law of Delaware (1967)) [hereinafter cited as Del. Corp. Law] (thirty share-
holders).
6 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1371(a) (1) (ten shareholders). Stock transfer
restrictions may also be used to exempt the corporation from the registration require-
ments of the Securities Acts of 1933. Since registration is a costly and time consuming
procedure, many corporations use stock transfer restrictions to obtain an exemption.
See 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 665-73 (2d ed. 1961).
7 See Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 691,
11 N,Y.S.2d 417, 422 (1939).
8 See Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 S.E. 744 (1921).
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wish to limit ownership to those who are employed by the corporation.° In
each type of corporation mentioned, the ability to select security holders will
also give the corporation a means of preventing competitors from purchasing
shares in order to participate in the policy decisions of the corporation 10 or in
order to look at the corporate books and records.11
As the examples given above indicate, there are a number of personal
and business purposes that may be served by being selective in choosing stock-
holders. This selectivity has been achieved most efficiently through the use of
stock transfer restrictions. Strictly speaking these restrictions are conditions
imposed on the right of the stockholder to alienate his interest in the securi-
ties. As used today, however, the phrase "stock transfer restrictions" encom-
passes any condition or privilege accompanying the right to freely transfer or
retain ownership in stock.
The most popular restriction is the "first-option,"'° which requires the
holder of the stock to give a named person, usually the corporation, an oppor-
tunity to purchase the stock before it can be transferred to a third party. The
optionee can permit the transfer if he finds the proposed transferee acceptable.
If not, the optionee can purchase the stock and hold it or sell it to an individ-
ual of his own choosing.
The second major type of restriction is the consent restriction. This re-
striction requires the holder of the stock to obtain the consent of some indi-
vidual or individuals, such as the board of directors, before a transfer of the
stock can be made. Although the person who must consent does not have the
right to buy the stock as he does when a first-option restriction exists, he can
obtain virtually the same control by choosing an acceptable transferee and re-
fusing to consent to a transfer to anyone else. In fact, the consent restriction
is often a better method of protection since exercise of the consent restriction
does not require an initial outlay of capital to channel the stock into the
hands of an acceptable holder.
The third major type of restriction is a buy-out agreement. This restric-
tion imposes an obligation on the corporation or the shareholders to purchase
the stock, and on the holder to sell the stock, upon the occurrence of a named
contingency, such as the death of the shareholder or his retirement from the
employment of the corporation. The bilateral obligations imposed by the re-
striction provide some protection to both the corporation and the holder of the
stock. The purchase gives the corporation the same opportunity to select new
shareholders that it enjoys with the first-option restriction, but this restriction
is broader in its application since it operates on more contingencies than just
the holder's attempt to transfer the shares. 13
 The shareholder, on the other
hand, is provided with a market for his stock which, if the corporation is
small, he might not otherwise be able to find.I4
9 See Martin v. Grayhar Elec. Co., 285 F.2d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 1961).
10 See Mason v. Mallard Tel. Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 1087, 240 N.W. 671, 675 (1932).
11 See Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 372, 178 N.W. 957,
959 (1920).
12 Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 Va. L. Rev.
229, 233 (1951).
18 See W.O. Barnes Co. v. Folsinski, 337 Mich. 370, 377, 60 N.W.2d 302, 306 (1953).
14 O'Neal, supra note 2, at 796.
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A full buy-out restriction is unnecessary, however, when both parties do
not require protection. If, for example, the shares are not readily marketable
and the corporation does not care who holds them, it is not necessary that
there be a requirement on the stockholder to sell, although the stockholder
may still need the protection of being able to require the corporation to pur-
chase. 15 On the other hand, if the shares are readily marketable, but the cor-
poration desires that all stockholders take an active part in the corporation,
only a requirement that a retiring stockholder offer the stock to the corpora-
tion is necessary. 1 °
Despite the extensive use of these stock transfer restrictions to achieve
corporate purposes,'' the courts have not always been willing to find them
valid. The English courts have held that stock represents a contractual rela-
tionship between the stockholder and the corporation. 18 As a result, these
courts permit almost all restrictions as valid terms of that contract. 19 Ameri-
can courts, on the other hand, have treated stock not only as evidence of a
contract but also as personal property. 2° As a result, transfer restrictions may
conflict with the common law principle that any attempt to restrain the trans-
fer of personal property is contrary to public policy.'
Initially the American courts viewed any restriction as a violation of pub-
lic policy, 22
 but gradually the courts began to realize the need for restrictions
in some corporations and that this need should be balanced against the policy
favoring free alienability.28 In evaluating the corporate need, the courts took
into account the size of the corporation, 24 its objectives, 25 its ownership dis-
tribution,28 and the possibility that hostile shareholders would seriously injure
it.27
 Then the courts focused on the restriction itself, looking at the degree of
restraint,28 its duration, 29 and the possibility that the type of restriction im-
15
 G. Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 195, at 258 (1959).
16 See Martin v. Graybar Elec. Co., 285 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1961).
17 A study in 1952 showed that nearly 50% of the corporations formed in Iowa
in a six-month period included stock transfer restriction provisions in their charters. It
is not known how many more provisions were placed in the by-laws or originated by
stockholder agreement. Hayes, Corporation Cake With Partnership Frosting, 40 Iowa
L. Rev. 157, 159, 181 (1954).
18 Grower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
Marv. L. Rev. 1369, 1377 (1956).
19 Id.
20 F. Christy, The Transfer of Stock § 36, at 5:1 (4th ed. 1967). Many corporation
statutes provide that shares of stock are personal property. See, e.g., Del. Corp. Law § 159.
21 Painter, Stock Transfer Restrictions: Continuing Uncertainties and a Legislative
Proposal, 6 Vill. L. Rev. 48, 49 (1960).
22 See, e.g., Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 141-42, 34 A. 1127, 1129
(1896).
23 See, e.g., Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ; Lawson
v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 A. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
24 See People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414, 420 (Ct, App. 1924).
25 See Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 A. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
26 See First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 34 Ohio Op. 359, 73 N.E.2d 93 (C.P. 1945).
27 See People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 III. App. 414, 420 (Ct. App. 1924).
28 See First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 34 Ohio Op. 359, 360, 73 N.E.2d 93, 94 (C.P.
1945).
29 See Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 484, 67 A.2d 56, 59-60 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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posed would serve the needs of the corporation. 8° The ultimate question to be
answered was "whether the restraint is sufficiently needed by the particular
enterprise to justify overriding the general policy against restraints on aliena-
tion."" Increasingly, modern courts have been willing to strike this balance
in favor of the corporation, and uphold restrictions that older courts had
found to be unreasonable."
The application of the modern balancing test is a compromise between
the policy against restraints on alienation and the legitimate business pur-
poses to be achieved. It has, however, created a great deal of uncertainty in
the law." There are a few categories of restrictions: first-option, consent,
and buy-out. Similarly, there are a few categories of corporations that use
stock transfer restrictions, such as dose corporations, employee owned corpo-
rations, and cooperative buildings. Yet in many jurisdictions there are no de-
cisions indicating whether the major types of corporations have a valid need
for restrictions, nor are there decisions considering the validity of one or more
of the major types of restrictions." Even if there were authority on each of the
types of restrictions, there would still be uncertainty as to the validity of some
terms, such as option price or time in which consent must be given." Also,
even within a particular type of corporation, each one is different in terms of
size, ownership distribution and objectives. Finally, existing case law is
frequently old and does not reflect the more permissive attitude of modern
courts." These uncertainties severely limit the ability of a corporation, in as-
sessing the alternative methods of control, to know, at a minimum, the validity
of the various types of stock transfer restrictions.
A number of states have enacted statutes to establish legislative authority
for stock transfer restrictions.37 The majority of these statutes do no more
than provide that restrictions may be placed in the by-laws or charter. While
recognizing the need for restrictions, they do not deal with the uncertainties
generated by the balancing test.
Recent state legislation, however, has attempted to provide some stabil-
ity and certainty in the area. The Texas Business Corporation Act" allows
the use of reasonable restrictions including "reasonably" imposed first-option
See Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 400, 2 A.2d 249, 252
(1938).
31 O'Neal, supra note 2, at 779.
32 Childs, Control of Transfer of Business Interests, 1958 U. Ill. L.F. 79, 83.
23 Painter, supra note 21, at 62.
34 See, e.g., Barron, Arrangements—Validity and Enforcement of Restrictions on
Share Transfer and Buy-Out Various Types of Restrictions in Ohio, 31 U. Cin. L. Rev.
266, 268-69 (1962), where the author recommends that consent restrictions should not
be used in Ohio since no Ohio cases have held them valid.
35 See In re West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wash. 2d 310, 317, 367 P.2d 807,
811 (1962).
36 O'Neal, supra note 2, at 780.
. 	 37 See, e.g., Cal, Corp. Code § 501(g) (West 1955); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.0105(1)(d)
(Supp. 1966). New Hampshire has a provision allowing for restrictions in the charter,
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 294:29 (1966), but also has a section that states that any by-
law imposing a restriction is void. Id. § 296:14.
38 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.22 (1956), as amended, (Supp. 1966). See also Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 64-211 (1966).
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and buy-sell restrictions. While the requirement that the restriction be reason-
able restates the common law, the fact that the legislature has specifically
enumerated these particular restrictions at least shows the courts that these
restrictions are not per se invalid. The Wyoming legislature has taken a
similar approach, although it has expanded the coverage of its statute to
include consent restrictions. 3°
The recently enacted Delaware Corporation Law" contains a section on
stock transfer restrictions similar to that enacted in Wyoming. Certain enu-
merated restrictions are permitted under section 202: a first option, a pur-
chase obligation, a consent requirement, and a restriction providing that the
holder may not transfer to certain persons or classes of persons 4 1 These re-
strictions, and any other lawful restrictions, may be enforced against the
holder of the securities or his successor or transferee." The statute also pro-
vides that restrictions used to maintain Subchapter S status under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code are conclusively presumed to be for a reasonable purpose."
Under section 202, permitted stock transfer restrictions may be placed in the
articles of incorporation, by-laws, or in a contract, but the holders of shares
issued before the restriction was imposed must consent to the restriction be-
fore their shares will be bound. 44 The restriction is ineffective, however, ex-
30 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-36.32 (1965). See Rudolph, The New Wyoming Business
Corporation Act, 15 Wyo. L.J. 185, 195 (1961).
40 Del. Corp. Law § 202.
41 (c) A restriction on the transfer of securities of a corporation is permitted
by this section if it:
(1) Obligates the holder of the restricted securities to offer to the cor-
poration or to any other holders of securities of the corporation or to any other
person or to any combination of the foregoing, a prior opportunity, to be exer-
cised within a reasonable time, to acquire the restricted securities; or
(2) Obligates the corporation or any holder of securities of the corpora-
tion or any other person or any combination of the foregoing, to purchase the
securities which are the subject of an agreement respecting the purchase and sale
of the restricted securities; or
(3) Requires the directors or the holders of any class of securities of the
corporation to consent to any proposed transfer of the restricted securities or
to approve the proposed transferee of the restricted securities; or
(4) Prohibits the transfer of the restricted securities to designated persons
or classes of persons, and such designation is not manifestly unreasonable.
Id. § 202 (c) .
42 (a) A written restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of a
security of a corporation, if permitted by this section and noted conspicuously
on the security, may be enforced against the holder of the restricted security
or any successor or transferee of the holder including an executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian or other fiduciary entrusted with like responsibility for the
person or estate of the holder....
Id. § 202(a).
43 Id. § 202(d).
Subchapter S permits certain close corporations to elect special tax status. A cor-
poration that elects this tax status is not subject to an income tax. Instead, its income
and losses are considered the income and losses of the shareholders. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, §§ 1371-77. See 1 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 2.04a (Supp. 1967).
44 (b) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of securities of
a corporation may be imposed either by the certificate of incorporation or by
the by-laws or by an agreement among any number of security holders or among
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cept against a person with actual knowledge of it, or unless the restriction is
noted conspicuously on the security. 45
The Delaware statute is important for a number of reasons. First, many
businesses are incorporated in Delaware," so that a corporation statute of
this state will have a widespread effect.47 Second, in Delaware, all of the is-
sued stock of all classes must be subject to one or more of the restrictions on
transfer permitted by section 202 to qualify for special privileges as a close
corporation." Finally, because of the uncertainties prevalent in the case law,
and the widespread use of stock transfer restrictions, if legislation such as the
Delaware statute injects the desired certainty without substantially im-
pairing the right of free alienation, this statute would serve as an excellent
model for future state legislation in this area.
This comment will attempt to analyze Section 202 of the Delaware Cor-
poration Law to ascertain the extent and manner in which it modifies the
common law relating to stock transfer restrictions and the desirability of these
modifications.
I. PERMITTED RESTRICTIONS
The first part of this comment deals with the scope of the restrictive pro-
visions permitted under section 202 and the extent to which the enforcement
of these restrictions modifies the common law. Subsection (c) provides for
four specified restrictions which are permitted under section 202. Beyond
these four, the scope of the enforceable restrictions must be determined under
the broad provisions of subsection (e), which states that other "lawful" re-
strictions are permitted under section 202. The word "lawful" as used in this
subsection might be narrowly construed to encompass only those restrictions
established by Delaware statutory authority, since the Delaware Corporation
Law does have other sections validating certain types of restrictions in
certain instances." This interpretation is not proper, however, since the word
"lawful" generally refers to more than just statutory authority. "Lawful" nor-
such holders and the corporation. No restriction so imposed shall be binding
with respect to securities issued prior to the adoption of the restriction unless
the holders of the securities are parties to an agreement or voted in favor of
the restriction.
Del. Corp. Law § 202(b).
45 (a) . . . . Unless noted conspicuously on the security, a restriction, even
though permitted by this section, is ineffective except against a person with
actual knowledge of the restriction.
Id. § 202(a).
46 See C. Rohrlich, Organizing Corporate and Other Business Enterprises § 6.01,
at 197 (rev. ed. 1953).
47 The validity of a stock transfer restriction is determined by the law of the state
in which the corporation using the restriction is incorporated. Palmer v. Chamberlin,
191 F.2d 532, 536-37 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 182, comment
b at 270 (1934).
48 Del. Corp. Law § 342(a)(2).
40 Close corporations may use a restriction setting out permitted classes of pur-
chasers. Del. Corp. Law § 342(b). They may also set a restriction on the total number
of shareholders which can be enforced against a person whose purchase of shares in-.




mally encompasses activities permitted under the common law as well." Also,
there would be no purpose in construing subsection (e) so narrowly since the
other restrictions under the Delaware Corporation Law contain their own en-
forcement provisions.51
 The more realistic interpretation of subsection (e)
would be to view it as incorporating within the enforcement provisions of sec-
tion 202 all those restrictions acceptable at common law under the traditional
balancing test.
The most important part of the section is subsection (c) which allows,
in any corporation, enforcement of the four permitted restrictions without the
use of the traditional balancing test. The approach of this subsection modifies
the approach of the earlier Texas and Wyoming statutes in two important as-
pects. First, both of the earlier statutes permitted restrictions, other than the
first option, to be valid with respect to a class of shares only if there were
twenty (20) or fewer shareholders in that class. 52 The Delaware statute does
not limit the application of its permitted restrictions to situations where there
are a specified number of shareholders. This, it is submitted, is the better ap-
proach.
Although selective transfers are primarily the concern of small, close cor-
porations, any attempt at a statutory definition of what constitutes a close
corporation is likely to be arbitrary." Also, under certain circumstances,
courts have held restrictions reasonable and necessary in large corporations
with substantial capita154 and a large number of shareholders. 55
 These large
corporations would benefit by the certainty afforded smaller corporations under
these statutes. Moreover, there is no substantial danger of widespread and in-
discriminate use of restrictions in these corporations. Restrictions in a large
enterprise create administrative burdens and difficulties in marketing the se-
curities quickly,56 so that the corporation, on its own, would require some sub-
stantial reason for the protection in order to contemplate undertaking these
problems. Since this is the case, an arbitrary number should not determine the
application of subsection (c). The better approach, adopted here by Dela-
ware, is to make no distinction based on the number of shareholders in the
class of shares restricted.57
The second, and most important manner, in which this section modifies
the earlier legislation in this area is that it allows the four permitted restric-
50 Cf. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 312-13, 93 A.2d 107, 117-
18 (Sup. Ct. 1952), where the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted a Delaware statute
providing that the certificate of incorporation may include any management provision
that is not contrary to the "laws" of Delaware as encompassing more than just the
statutory "laws" of Delaware.
51 Del. Corp. Law §§ 347(d), 349.
52
 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.22B(2) (1956); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-36.32(c), (d)
(1965).
53 1948 New York Law Revision Comm'n Report 386.
54 See Martin v. Graybar Elec. Co., 285 F.2d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 1961) (corporation
had annual sales of $490,000,000).
56 See Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 537 (5th Cir. 1951) (one hundred
and fifty-one shareholders).
56 Painter, supra note 21, at 66-67.
57 See O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 341, 359 (1958).
411
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
tions in subsection (c) to be enforced without the application of the balancing
test. The legislature has, in effect, carved out from the common law four ex-
ceptions to the balancing test and has declared those restrictions reasonable
per se.
A. The First-Option Restriction
The first-option restriction, or as it is termed in the statute a "first oppor-
tunity," gives the designated optionee the right to purchase the shares at an
agreed on price, or at a price to be set by a formula, before the holder can
transfer the shares to a third party. At common law, in almost all jurisdic-
tions, this restriction has been recognized as a reasonable condition on trans-
fer," provided that the characteristics of the corporation are such that there
is a recognized need for the use of a stock restriction."
The first option is the most popular stock transfer restriction." The op-
tionee may consent to the transfer if he believes it to be in his best interest.
If not, the use of the option permits the optionee directly to control the trans-
fer of the shares between the prior holder and the new owner. As a purchaser,
the optionee is able to retain the shares, or personally select among willing
purchasers outside of the corporation, or sell the shares to present managers
or employees in order to strengthen their interest in the company. Also, since
the restriction is acceptable almost everywhere, its certainty makes it attrac-
tive.
The disadvantage of the first-option restriction is that it often requires a
substantial outlay of capital to purchase the shares. An individual optionee
may not be able to raise the necessary capital within the time in which the
option is exercisable." The corporation also may not have the finances avail-
able to exercise the option. 82 The corporation may create a reserve fund for
this purpose," but that may require the withdrawal of substantial funds from
the operation of the business.
There is a second reason why the corporation may be unable to purchase
the stock. The Delaware Corporation Law, 64 like many corporation statutes,"
provides that the corporation may not purchase its shares if such purchase
53 See F. Christy, supra note 20, § 39, at 5:10 n.9; O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer
of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 773,
781 (1952).
56 O'Neal, supra note 58, at 781.
60 2 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 7.09, at 13 (1958).
61 See Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951), in which
stockholders could not raise the money necessary to exercise a purchase option on 4,000
shares that represented a controlling interest in the corporation.
62 For a discussion of the possible methods of financing payment of the option
price and the problems associated with financing, see 2 F. O'Neal, supra note 60, § 7.25.
63 In Delaware, a corporation is authorized by statute to create such a special
reserve fund. Del. Corp. Law § 171. Since a shareholder in a close corporation frequently
will not attempt to transfer except at his death, insurance on the life of the shareholder
can often be used to get the necessary capital. In Delaware, insurance on the life of a
stockholder, with the corporation as beneficiary, is authorized by statute. Id. § 122(16).
See Thomas, Ingenuity Needed in Many Buy/Sell Situations, 16 J. Am. Soc'y
101 (1962).
64 Del. Corp. Law § 160.
65 6A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 2848 (Perm,
ed. 1950). See also ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 5 (1966).
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will in any way impair the capital of the corporation. This means that the
corporation can buy its stock only when it has surplus, and not when the ag-
gregate value of its assets is less than the value of its outstanding capital
stock."' It is possible that at the time the option becomes exercisable the cor-
poration will have no surplus and, therefore, be unable to purchase the shares.
These disadvantages, which arise as a result of the necessity to purchase
the stock in order to control transfer, may be used by the shareholder if he
does not wish to be bound by the restriction. The shareholder may hold his
shares until he believes that the optionee does not have the financial resources
or cannot meet the requisite surplus requirement, and then announce his in-
tention to sell to a third party.
Since the first-option restriction does not severely restrict the transfer of
shares and has been upheld by the courts in most corporations, the adoption
of the per se rule in this statute is not a significant change in the law. The
only possible change in the law would be in regard to large corporations in
which the courts have not always been willing to allow any restrictions. 67 At
the same time, however, it is not likely to be used in the larger corporations,
since it would require the availability, at least, of excess capital each time
there is a transfer in order to maintain sufficient control, as well as creating
administrative burdens and difficulties in marketing the stock. In any event,
the added certainty that the per se rule provides justifies any harm that may
result from allowing the first-option restriction in the large corporation.
Three points should be noted with regard to the manner in which the
statute is drafted. First, the statute requires the option to be exercised within
a reasonable time after the shareholder informs the corporation that he de-
sires to transfer his shares. There is, however, no definition of reasonable
time in this context, either in the statute or at common law. 68
 This should not
create any difficulties, however, since in no case has an otherwise valid restric-
tion been invalidated because the option time was unreasonable, and options
up to six months have been allowed."
Second, there is no requirement under the statute that the option price be
reasonable. This follows the common law approach that a valid restriction is a
contractual agreement and the parties should be bound to the provisions of a
contract to which they have assented," even though there is a wide discrep-
ancy between market value and the option price.n This is the better ap-
proach. The parties should be permitted to establish the terms of their agree-
ments without judicial interference. They are still protected against fraud or
bad faith in the making of the contract or in its application since the directors
66
 In re Int'l Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358, 361, 92 A. 255, 256 (1914). See also
Del. Corp. Law § 154.
67 2 F. O'Neal, supra note 60, § 7.06, at 10.
68 O'Neal, supra note 58, at 774.
69 See Weiland v. Hogan, 177 Mich. 626, 143 N.W. 599 (1913).
70
 Arentsen v. Sherman Towel Serv. Co., 352 Ill. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933).
71
 In re Mather's Estate, 410 Pa, 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963) (option price of one
dollar allowed for stock worth not less than one thousand and sixty dollars a share);
Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957)
(option price set at the shareholders purchase price even though the stock had risen
greatly in value).
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and stockholders have a duty to exercise good faith in their dealings with
stockholders. If a corporation were to adopt a first-option restriction in which
the price was established through fraud or bad faith on the part of directors
or shareholders, there would be a violation of this duty. 72 These principles
give adequate protection and, as a result, a provision requiring a reasonable
price is not needed.
The third point to be noted is that options based on contingencies other
than the transfer of the stock are not permitted per se under section 202. Op-
tions to purchase on the retirement of an employee are quite common and are
upheld by modern courts." They serve a legitimate corporate function by
limiting the shareholders to those employed by the corporation,'" thereby us-
ing employee ownership to create a personal interest in the business and, also,
inducing valuable employees to remain with the corporation if they want to
retain what may be a valuable interest. 75 At the,same time, such a provision
protects the corporation from disgruntled former employees." This restriction
may be abused, however, by directors or shareholders acting in bad faith. An
employee may be dismissed so that his shares may be purchased to obtain
their enhanced market value or liquidation value or to obtain their voting
control." Even if the shares are not redistributed for these purposes, the de-
crease in the number of outstanding shares will increase the value of the re-
maining shares.78
An option based on a contingency other than sale was invalidated under
the Delaware common law in Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc.79 There,
however, the option was exercisable for an indefinite time after termination of
employment. The validity of these restrictions, nevertheless, remains in doubt
in Delaware. Since the option does serve legitimate corporate purposes, a leg-
islative declaration of its status would be of substantial benefit. The difficulties
experienced in the Greene case could be adequately covered by a requirement
similar to that in the first-option provision, that the option be exercised within
a reasonable time. The abuses connected with this type of restriction could be
eliminated by rigorous enforcement of the good faith requirements on the part
of the courts. Thus, if the shareholder is dismissed in order to obtain his
shares for their monetary or control value, the court could invalidate that par-
ticular transaction without denying validity to these restrictions in general.
Certainly the question of corporate need for the restriction is separate from
72 Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Although there have
been no Delaware cases on this exact point, the Delaware courts have recognized the
duty of directors to shareholders and shareholders to each other in analogous situa-
tions. See Corbett v. McClintic-Marshall Corp., 17 DeI. Ch. 165, 151 A. 218 (1930)
(duty of directors to shareholders); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6,
99 A.2d 236 (1953) (duty of shareholders to each other).
73 2 F. O'Neal, supra note 60, § 7.09, at 14-15.
74 Martin v. Graybar Elec. Co., 285 F.2d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 1961).
75 Harker v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 F.2d 929, 930 (7th Cir. 1930). See Grossman &
Herzel, Employee Stock Options, 1958 U. III. L.F. 45.
76 Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N.Y.S. 873 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
77 Note, Exercising Options to Repurchase Employee-Held Stock: A Question of
Good Faith, 68 Yale L.J. 773 (1959).
78 Id. at 774.
79 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (1938).
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that of the corporation's good faith in exercising the option." It is submitted
that a per se rule should be adopted for options on contingencies other than
the transfer of the stock. This would inject the desired certainty without
denying the courts the ability to prevent abuses of the option if the corpora-
tion has acted in bad faith.
B. The Obligation to Purchase
The required-purchase obligation in part two of subsection (c) is the
counterpart of the first option. The required-purchase obligates the corpora-
tion or some other designated individual to purchase the shares at the option
of the holder. This restriction is primarily for the benefit of the individual
holder. It is used in small corporations where the shares are not readily mar-
ketable, especially if they represent a minority interest. 81 It is also used when
employees are required to purchase stock as a condition of employment. 82
The disadvantages with this restriction are similar to those involved in
the first-option restriction. The corporation or some other individual must be
able to meet their obligation when the holder exercises his option. This may
require the setting aside of substantial capital in a reserve fund. Also, the pos-
sibility that the individual or the corporation may, by reason of the capital
necessary or the surplus requirement, be unable to purchase the shares under-
mines the protection apparently afforded by the restriction. Finally, the sur-
plus requirement may be used as a loophole. The corporation, if it does not
desire to be bound by the restriction, may balance its books in such a way as
to indicate a lack of sufficient surplus. 83
If the restriction imposed obligates the corporation, or some individual,
to purchase the shares, there should be no question of its validity. It does not,
in such a case, impose a restraint on the right to alienate, but rather gives a
right to the holder to require a third party to purchase the shares. The only
objection to such an agreement has been that the contract is illusory since the
corporation or individual might not have the funds to purchase the shares
when the option is due.84 This objection has not been followed in recent
cases,85 nor is it likely that it will be in the future." Since this restriction has
been accepted by the courts,87 this part of subsection (c) serves only to clarify
that acceptance.
Some difficulty is created, however, by the provision in this part of sub-
section (c) that the obligation to purchase is permitted on securities "which
80 Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 675-76, 121 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1954).
81 F. O'Neal & J. Derwin, Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates § 2.15,
at 31 (1961).
82 G. Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 195, at 258-59 (1959).
83 Id. at 259.
84 See Topkin, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 210, 163 N.E.
735, 736 (1928).
85 Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining, 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 314, 34 Cal. Rptr. 317,
324 (1963).
86 2 F. O'Neal, supra note 60, § 7.10, at 16.
87 Barron, supra note 34, at 274. When conditioned on death, such agreements have
been attacked on the grounds that they are testamentary and, therefore, must comply
with the statutory will formalities. These attacks have failed. See Chase Nat'l Bank v.
Manufacturers Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 406, 410, 39 N.Y.S.2d 370, 374 (1943).
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are the subject of an agreement respecting the purchase and sale of the re-
stricted securities." There is no indication as to what type of agreement the
legislature was referring to, nor as to who must be a party to the agreement.
The word "agreement" is used in subsection (b) to refer to one of the possible
vehicles for imposing a restriction—charter, by-laws or agreement. In this
context, "agreement" means a contract among the holders, or between the
holders and the corporation, to impose a given restriction. This meaning does
not appear to be carried into subsection (c), since there is no apparent reason
for permitting an obligation-to-purchase restriction to be imposed only by a
contract among the holders or between the holders and the corporation.
Two alternative interpretations of the word "agreement" as it is used in
subsection (c) may reasonably be made. First, it may refer to a different type
of agreement among the holders or between the holders and the corporation.
That is, it may be "an agreement respecting the purchase and sale of the
restricted securities," but not an agreement imposing an obligation-to-purchase
restriction. Second, it may be an agreement imposing an obligation-to-purchase
restriction, but not one among the holders or between the holders and the
corporation.
If the first interpretation is accepted, the problem narrows to determining
exactly what type of agreement subsection (c) is referring to. The best ex-
planation would be that it refers to the other restrictions of section 202—
first-option, consent or restricted class of purchasers. The effect of the sub-
section would then be to require that the obligation-to-purchase be imposed
only in conjunction with one of the other permitted restrictions. Although
this interpretation fits the language of the statute, there does not appear to
be any reason for the limitation that results. As pointed out above, the obliga-
tion-to-purchase is not a restriction on free alienability and it would ordinarily
be permitted even in the absence of the statutory provisions.
The second interpretation narrows the inquiry to determining who the
parties to the agreement must be. This can be answered by examining the na-
ture of the obligation-to-purchase restriction. Although it is a "restriction"
imposed on securities under subsection (c), it obligates a third party, not the
holder, to purchase. Of course, the third party would have to agree to be so
bound. The subsection may be restating only this obvious requirement. This
interpretation is also consistent with the language of the statute, but, again,
there is one difficulty. If so interpreted, the language "agreement respecting
the purchase and sale of the restricted securities" is unnecessary.
Even though both interpretations have deficiencies, the second seems
best. It is hard to imagine that the legislature through ambiguous language
intended to impose an unnecessary additional limitation. It is more probable
that it included the additional language to make clear that the "purchaser"
must assent to the restriction. Clarity did not result, however, and the in-
tended meaning can be established with certainty only through legislative
amendment.
C. Restrictions Prohibiting Classes of Transferees
Part four of subsection (c) permits a restriction which prohibits the
transfer of restricted securities to designated persons or classes of persons, if
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such designation is not "manifestly unreasonable." Under this restriction the
parties can agree initially to prohibit certain transfers to insure that undesir-
able persons do not become shareholders. While this "veto" power is similar
to that of the consent restraint, this restriction permits certain persons to be
excluded ab initio, thereby reducing or eliminating conflicts which may de-
velop later when individual transfers are considered. Any such conflicts are
particularly harmful to a small, close corporation." The use of set standards,
to which the parties have assented, will also help to guide conduct and prevent
delays and disappointments by establishing the requirements before the indi-
vidual transfers are contemplated.
The disadvantages of such a restriction are obvious. It can supply only
partial control since it applies only to certain transferees. Second, it is difficult
to draft a restriction that is not either so broad as to restrict harmless trans-
fers, or so narrow that it provides inadequate protection. Finally, the estab-
lishment of rigid classes does not permit consideration of exceptions for
unusual cases or for changes in the corporate needs. Of course, the charter, by-
laws, or contract may be amended to fit these exceptions, but, as will be seen
later, this may be a difficult process."
For two reasons it is difficult to assess the extent to which the restriction
adopted here has actually modified the common law. First, there are almost
no cases treating the validity of these restrictions at common law" and none
of the existing cases were decided in Delaware. Second, even if prohibited
class restrictions were acceptable under present day common law standards,
the crux of the statutory section is the meaning of the words "manifestly un-
reasonable," a term not found in the common law dealing with stock transfer
restrictions." To determine if a restriction is manifestly unreasonable, the
court must necessarily look to the corporation, its size, type, location, owner-
ship distribution, and objectives—the same factors balanced at common law.
The effect of the manifestly unreasonable standard, then, would be to modify,
but not overrule, the common law. It provides the court with much more lati-
tude in permitting the restriction, but it is not a per se rule as are the others
enumerated in subsection (c). The scope of the increase in liberality, however,
88 See Moses v. Soule, 63 Misc. 203, 209, 118 N.Y.S. 410, 414 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
89 See pp. 427-28 infra.
90 Although this restriction was before the court in one early case, the court rested
its decision on the fact the restriction was placed in the by-laws and did not even dis-
cuss the validity of the restriction if it were properly imposed. Kretzer v. Cole Bros.
Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S.W. 1066 (Ct. App. 1916). One recent case
has apparently upheld such a restriction. In re West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wash.
2d 310, 367 P.2d 807 (1962). Also, the Supreme Court of the United States has sug-
gested that such a restriction might be valid under California law. Eccles v. Peoples
Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 433 (1948).
91 Massachusetts, which follows the English contractual approach to stock transfer
restrictions, uses a standard of "palpably unreasonable" to test the validity of all types
of restrictions. Longyear v. Hardman, 219 Mass. 405, 408, 106 N.E. 1012, 1013 (1914).
Since "palpably unreasonable" seems to be synonymous with "manifestly unreasonable,"
the Massachusetts stock transfer restriction cases might be of some help in interpreting
this part of the Delaware statute. Any interpretational help from the Massachusetts
cases, however, would have to be gained by analogizing the facts in these cases to the
prohibited-class-of-purchaser restriction, since the Massachusetts courts have never con-
sidered this type of restriction.
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is almost impossible to predict. Until the Delaware courts or legislature indi-
cate the correct interpretation of this phrase, the extent of the change from
the common Iaw will remain in doubt.
One further point to be noted with regard to this section is that it only
permits certain classes of purchasers to be prohibited as transferees. In a later
section of the Delaware Corporation Law,92
 dealing with special stock trans-
fer restrictions permissible for close corporations, the legislature has permitted
the use of restrictions establishing both prohibited classes of purchasers and
permitted classes of purchasers. Section 202 specifically provides for the for-
mer restriction, but not the latter. The difference between the two restrictions
may be only a question of semantics, of course. If exceedingly broad classes of
prohibited purchasers were enumerated, only a limited number of persons
would be able to purchase, a result that would normally be obtained with a
restriction that permits only certain purchasers. In most circumstances, how-
ever, to allow all but certain persons to purchase is less restrictive than to al-
low only certain persons to purchase. 93
The difference between these two types of classes is important to the
courts for two reasons. First, in assessing the validity of a restriction, the
court should determine if the restriction is framed in terms of prohibited
classes, which are allowed under section 202, or permitted classes, which are
allowed only under the close corporation subchapter. Secondly, since the legis-
lature has allowed only prohibited classes of purchasers, this is indicative of
the scope of the manifestly unreasonable standard. The use of exceedingly
broad classes of prohibited purchasers so that, in effect, only a limited number
of persons are able to purchase is a mere change in form over a permitted
class of purchasers restriction. Therefore, to uphold such a restriction would
contravene the intent of the legislature. In such an instance, the restriction
should be held to be within the intended scope of the manifestly unreasonable
standard.
D. The Consent Restriction
Part three of subsection (c) permits the use of a consent restriction re-
quiring the holder of stock to obtain the consent of the corporation or other
designated individuals before he can transfer the securities. The use of this re-
striction allows the corporation or its shareholders to exercise control over the
transfer of stock when it can not, or does not wish to, purchase the shares. By
withholding consent to sales to particular purchasers, the party whose consent
must be obtained can maintain almost the same control offered by a first
option, but without the expenditure of capital.
There is a distinct disadvantage to the consent restriction, however. Un-
der the first option, the shareholder is able to transfer his shares, and at a
price mutually agreed on. Here, the holder is under the thumb of the consent-
ing party, and cannot sell or transfer his shares to anyone without the ap-
proval of the consenting party." This is not to say that the consenting party
92 Del. Corp. Law § 342(b).
92 Such a distinction was recognized at common law with regard to restraints on
the alienation of real property. J. Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property § 41
(1895).
94 Courts have recognized that the consent restriction is much more restrictive than
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is not held to a standard of good faith. Good faith is read into each contract,
and would undoubtedly be required here, as it has been required at common
law." The refusal of consent would have to be for the purpose of choosing an
acceptable transferee, and not arbitrarily," or for personal grounds unrelated
to the corporation or its business. 07 Nevertheless, bad faith may be difficult
to prove, and requires litigation. Even assuming good faith, however, the
peculiarities of the situation may effect a restraint on alienation for a sub-
stantial period of time until an acceptable purchaser is found.
Since the requirement of relying on another's consent can create a serious
restraint, the courts at common law have been understandably reluctant to
uphold this restriction." Much of the present uncertainty, however, regarding
the validity of this restriction is attributable to the fact that much of the au-
thority in this area is old" and does not necessarily represent the more liberal
attitude of modern courts. Nevertheless, the adoption of the per se rule for
this restriction is probably the most significant change that subsection (c)
makes from the common law.
Because of the disadvantages of this restriction and its uncertain validity
at common law, one writer has suggested that it is unnecessary, and that a
first-option restriction should be used in its place.'" That restriction, however,
may not always be available for control of the transfer. The ease with which
the consent restriction permits control, and the fact that it does not require
substantial capital from the business or the shareholders, are compelling rea-
sons for the use of a consent restriction. On the balance, the valuable and
beneficial protection offered, and the certainty in a very uncertain area, are
sufficient to justify the per se rule adopted here; provided, however, that the
requirement of good faith is vigorously applied by the courts.
Two points should be noted with regard to the manner in which this sub-
section is drafted. First, there is no requirement attached to the consent re-
striction that the consenting party act within a reasonable time. Stock which
the holder desires to transfer is, in effect, unalienable during the time that the
interested party is deciding whether or not to exercise an option or give his
consent."' For this reason a requirement was imposed in the first-option re-
striction that the action be taken within a reasonable time. There, however,
an extended amount of time may be desired to raise the necessary capital. In
the first-option restriction. First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 34 Ohio Op. 359, 360, 73 N.E.2d
93, 94 (C.P. 1945).
55 See Carlson v. Ringgold County Mut. Tel. Co., 252 Iowa 748, 760, 108 N.W.2d
478, 485 (1961); Dolese Bros. Co. v. Brown, 39 Del. Ch. 1, 157 A.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
See also Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 512, 245 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct.
1963), rev'd on other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 718, 205 N.E.2d 196, 256 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1965).
00 Carlson v. Ringgold County Mut. Tel. Co., 252 Iowa 748, 760-61, 108 N.W.2d
478, 485 (1961).
57 See Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1958).
98 See Tracey v. Franklin, 30 DeI. Ch. 407, 414, 61 A.2d 780, 784 (1948), aff'd, 31
Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Douglas v. Aurora Daily News Co,, 160 M.
App. 506 (Ct. App. 1911).
In O'Neal, supra note 58, at 780.
100 Comment, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Close Corporation—A Statu-
tory Proposal, 17 Hastings L.J. 583, 595 (1966).
101 Deibel v. Kaufman, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 62 N.E.2d 770 (Ct. App. 1945).
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the consent restriction, there is no financial necessity to delay the decision;
yet, because there may be delays such as by a deadlock or unavailability of
the consenting parties,'° 2 some requirement of reasonable time should be in-
cluded so that alienability will not be delayed for too long a period.
The second point to be noted is that no test of reasonableness is estab-
lished. The section of‘the statute dealing with prohibited persons or classes of
persons sets the standard, "manifestly unreasonable." There, however, since
the classes are set in the restriction, a court can easily see the degree of re-
straint and evaluate the reasons for their establishing the restriction. The rea-
sonableness of the consent restriction can be evaluated only as it is applied to
individual transfers. The exercise of the restriction involves evaluation by the
consenting party of the personality of the new transferee and his desire to work
with present stockholders in managing the corporation. The benefit of the con-
sent restriction is that it provides this opportunity to make a personal evalua-
tion and, so long as this personal evaluation is exercised in good faith, no ob-
jective standard of reasonableness should be imposed by the courts. If the
restriction is to be accepted at all, it should be accepted without this possibil-
ity of judicial interference.
II. SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
Subsection (d) provides that any restriction imposed to maintain Sub-
chapter S status as an electing small business corporation is conclusively pre-
sumed to be for a reasonable purpose. At common law the court would look at
such restrictions in terms of the balancing test, weighing the degree of re-
straint against the purpose to be served. Here the statute establishes the pur-
pose as reasonable. The effect of this section on the balancing test is uncer-
tain. It may be that, even assuming a reasonable purpose, the degreb of
restraint in some cases might be so severe that the Delaware court would find
the restraint outweighed the purpose. This does not appear to be the approach
followed by the court in the case of Tracey v. Franklin.103 Here the re-
straint involved was a prohibition on the sale of stock for a period of almost
ten years. The lower court stated that the restraint itself was invalid, no mat-
ter what the purpose might be.'" The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed,
but noted that even this restriction must be looked at in terms of the purpose
served. If a sufficiently reasonable purpose were shown, the restriction would
be valid.
If the term "reasonable purpose" is construed by the courts to mean a
sufficiently reasonable purpose to uphold any restriction, then all restrictions
to maintain Subchapter S status would be upheld. It is doubtful that this was
the effect intended by the legislature, however. The statute does not establish
all restrictions used to maintain Subchapter S status as reasonable, but only
that the purpose is reasonable.
The third possibility is that the court should look to the means involved
to attain the reasonable purpose, as well as the purpose itself. In Tracey v.
Franklin, the court stated that a restriction would be valid "where the circum-
102 See In re Copal Varnish Co., [1917] 2 Ch. 349.
108 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
104 30 Del. Ch. 407, 414, 61 A.2d 780, 784 (1948).
420
STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
stances of a particular case convince the court that it is a reasonable means of
accomplishing a purpose recognized as proper."'" If this approach is followed
in interpreting subsection (d), the court would allow a restriction imposed for
Subchapter S purposes but only if the type of restriction used is reasonable in
the light of the types of restrictions that could have been used. Since the four
types of restrictions enumerated in subsection (c) are reasonable per se, the
court is likely to hold that one of these types must be used if it will accomplish
the desired end.
An analysis of the requirements of Subchapter S indicate that the restric-
tions already permitted would be sufficient to protect the corporation. The
basic requirements of Subchapter S as they concern us here are: there must be
ten or fewer shareholders; 108 all shares must be held by individuals or es-
tates: 107 shareholders cannot be non-resident aliens.'" Most of these qualifi-
cations could be met by the use of the restrictions permitted under section 202,
principally the restrictions prohibiting certain persons or classes of persons
from purchasing. Also, a corporation attempting to maintain Subchapter S
status could elect to become a close corporation under the Corporation Law's
special subtitle dealing with those corporations.'" If the corporation chooses
to accept this status, it may use the additional stock transfer restrictions per-
mitted there. Close corporations are allowed restrictions limiting the number
of shareholders,'" and restrictions permitting only certain persons to hold
shares.'"
Since the use of these specifically permitted restrictions would adequately
protect the corporation without resorting to subsection (d) of section 202, it
is submitted that this subsection should be deleted from the statute. It inter-
jects a confusing and uncertain effect on the law in this area, and may lead
the Delaware courts to validate restrictions that severely limit the freedom of
alienation when such restrictions are unnecessary.
III. CREATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS
A. Creation
Subsection (b) of section 202 provides that restrictions may be imposed
by the articles of incorporation or by-laws, or by an agreement either among
the shareholders or between the shareholders and the corporation. The subsec-
tion goes on to provide that as to shares issued prior to the adoption of the re-
striction, the restriction shall not be binding unless the shareholders are par-
ties to an agreement or voted in favor of the restriction.
At common law, courts generally recognized the right to impose restric-
tions by contract or the articles of incorporation, but the courts split on
whether restrictions can be imposed in the by-laws. 112 Some courts felt that
105 31 Del. Ch. at 484, 67 A.2d at 59.
106 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1371(a)(1).
107 Id. § 1371(a) (2).
108 Id. § 1371(a) (3).
100 Del. Corp. Law § 342(a)(1) (thirty shareholders).
110 Id. § 347(b).
111 Id. § 342(b).
112 Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 Va. L. Rev.
229, 235-36 (1951).
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by-Iaws concerned the general management of the corporation 113
 or the for-
malities of transfer,'" and could not be used to impose restrictions unless
there was specific statutory authority.115
 Courts now uphold by-laws im-
posing restrictions either by finding the necessary statutory authority,'" or by
finding that the by-law is an enforceable contract among the parties voting
for it.'" The effect of this latter approach is to enforce restrictions in the
by-laws only against those who have assented thereto. As to shares issued
prior to imposition of the restriction, the same result is required by subsection
202(b) of the Delaware Corporation Law.
The statute adopts the better approach in allowing restrictions to be
placed in the by-laws as well as in the articles of incorporation. The only prac-
tical effect is in the vote required to carry the restriction. As to unissued
shares, the stockholders should be free to set the percentage of outstanding
shares required to impose a restriction at any number they desire. Imposition
of restrictions on issued shares presents a different problem because it may de-
prive existing shareholders of their ability to alienate stock even though they
do not vote for the restriction. This problem is taken care of by the latter part
of subsection (b) which requires assent to restrictions on issued shares and
should not influence the determination of whether to allow restrictions in the
by-laws.
The approach of the statute to the imposition of restrictions on issued
shares is also reasonable. There is good reason to require the consent of the
outstanding shareholders to the imposition of the restrictions on issued
shares.'" These restrictions may involve serious limitations on the free aliena-
tion of the stock, or serious financial obligations on the corporation or the
shareholders.
An inequitable situation may result, however, if the requirement that
holders of outstanding shares assent to a restriction on issued shares is ap-
plied to restrictions imposed before the effective date of this statute.'" Those
1 13
 Id. at 236; see Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 38-39,
145 A. 391, 393 (1929).
114 See Kretzer v. Cole Bros. Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 103-04, 181
S.W. 1066, 1067 (Ct. App. 1916) ; Morris v. Hussong Dyeing Mach. Co., 81 N.J. Eq.
256, 260, 86 A. 1026, 1028 (1913).
115 Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 110, 91 N.E. 991, 994 (1910).
118 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-306a (Supp. 1966) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. 608.0105-
(I) (d) (Supp. 1966) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 496A.26 (1962).
117
 See First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 34 Ohio Op. 359, 362, 73 N.E.2d 93, 97 (C.P.
1945) ; Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 39, 145 A. 391, 393 (1929).
118
 Painter, Stock Transfer Restrictions: Continuing Uncertainties and a Legislative
Proposal, 6 Vill. L. Rev. 48, 65 (1960). But see Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61
Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d 828, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1964).
119
 In Delaware this provision probably would not be applied to restrictions
enacted before the effective date of this statute since to do so would make the statute
retroactive and "retroactive operation will not be inferred." Bowling v. Delaware Rayon
Co., 38 Del. 111, 114, 188 A. 769, 770 (Super. Ct. 1937). Therefore, in Delaware the
common law may govern voting requirements for restrictions imposed before the ef-
fective date of the statute. There are, however, no cases in Delaware treating voting
requirements for the imposition of restrictions on issued shares. In other jurisdictions,
the courts have taken divergent views on these voting requirements. Compare Sandor
Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), with Tu-Vu Drive-
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who voted for the restriction on the assumption that all shares would be bound
now hold restricted securities. But those dissenting to this restriction would,
under this statute, be free to alienate their shares. As a result, up to one half
of the securities may not be restricted. Since only some of the shareholders
may be bound, there may no longer be a substantial corporate purpose served
by the restriction. Competitors can now buy to look at corporate books and
records. Any scheme of employee ownership might now be destroyed, and the
harmony of the close corporation impaired. Yet, because the statute, in adopting
a per se rule, does not require a substantial purpose, unless the shareholders
vote to remove the restriction, the shares will remain bound. Such a vote to
remove the restriction may, as shall be seen later, require the unanimous con-
sent of all shareholders, and the shareholders with unrestricted securities are
not likely to vote for removal. A provision should be included in the statute
to remedy this situation by allowing the holders of restricted securities to re-
consider their vote for restrictions on issued shares if the restrictions were
adopted prior to the enactment of the statute.
One further difficulty arises with regard to the requirement of consent by
the holder of stock issued prior to the adoption of the restriction. The statute
requires that the "holder" be a party to an agreement or have voted in favor
of the restriction before the securities will be bound. Under the literal mean-
ing of this subsection, even if a prior shareholder did vote for a restriction,
his transferee, the present "holder," is not bound since he did not vote for the
restriction nor was he a party to a contract in which he agreed to be bound.
It is not likely, however, that the legislature intended to bind only the
immediate assenting parties and not transferees who have notice of the restric-
tion. This particular part of subsection (b) refers to restrictions which "shall
be binding with respect to securities." It does not refer to the subsequent en-
forcement of the restrictions. This part, therefore, is aimed at the initial ap-
plication of the restriction to the securities, requiring the holder to assent to
the imposition of a restriction in order to bind these shares. Once the restric-
tion has attached to the securities by reason of the holder's consent, it could
be enforced against a subsequent holder of the securities so bound under the
provisions of subsection (a).
B. Enforcement
Subsection (a) of section 202 contains the enforcement provision. The
subsection provides that before the restriction may be enforced it must be
noted conspicuously on the security, or the shareholder must have actual
knowledge of it. This follows the approach of the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter referred to as the Code], enacted in Delaware, in three aspects.
First, both statutes require only that the restriction be noted, not set out in
fulI.'20 This has long been the law in Delaware under the Uniform Stock
In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d 828, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1964). The best
approach in Delaware may be for the court to use the statute as a statement of public
policy in this area and follow it in requiring that the holder agree to any restriction
on the transfer of issued stock.
120 See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 8-204, -301.
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Transfer Act 121
 Second, both the Code and the Corporation Law allow en-
forcement of the restriction, even if it is not noted, as long as there is actual
knowledge of its presence. 122 This is a change from the Uniform Stock Trans-
fer Act which did not provide for enforcement against one with knowledge if
the restriction was not noted on the stock. 123 Third, section 202 requires the
notation of all restrictions. Section 8-204 of the Code requires that restrictions
on transfer be noted only if they were imposed by the corporation. Section
8-301(2), however, protects a bona fide purchaser of stock against adverse
claims which include transfer restrictions. Therefore, under the Code, notation
is required not only as to issuer's restrictions but also as to restrictions other-
wise imposed in order to protect the parties from a purchaser without
knowledge.
Subsection (a) further provides that restrictions permitted under section
202, and noted on the securities may be enforced against the holder, or any
transferee or successor of the holder, including an executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian or other fiduciary entrusted with like responsibility for the
holder or his estate. In measuring the effect of this statute upon the common
law, two points must be considered. First, the statute provides for enforcement
of permitted restrictions against certain parties. It does not stipulate what
remedies will be given after the right to enforce is established. Presumably,
the remedy to be given is to be determined by the courts under common law
principles. At common law, an equitable remedy can be obtained, providing
that the option price is not unconscionable to the extent it is indicative of
fraud 124 or the terms of the restriction are not too indefinite to be enforced. 122
Any legal remedy would, in most instances, be inadequate since the purpose
of the restriction is to insure that only certain persons hold the stock. The
harm to the corporation or other shareholders if the stock were to go to a com-
petitor or investor could never be assessed in terms of a dollar value.'" Thus
at common Iaw, the courts have permitted refusals to transfer on the books of
the corporation,' 27 injunctions against sales, 128 or to rescind sales,122 or ac-
tions for declaratory relief, 12° or for immediate enforcement of restrictions,
121 Allen
 v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 539-40, 141 N.E.2d 812, 814-15,
161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 420-21 (1957); Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 15.
122 See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 8-204, -301.
123 Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 15. There was disagreement in the courts as to
the effect of the failure of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act to provide for purchasers
with actual notice. Some courts held that the purchaser with actual notice was not
bound unless the presence of the restriction was noted on the shares. See Hopwood v.
Topsham Tel. Co., 120 Vt. 97, 132 A.2d 170 (1957). Other courts held that the pur-
chaser with actual notice was bound. See Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121
N.E.2d 622 (1954).
124 Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 541 (5th Cir. 1951). Cf. Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-302.
125 Hardin v. Rosenthal, 213 Ga. 319, 98 S.E.2d 901 (1957).
128 See Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 173, 290 N.W. 367, 369
(1940).
127 See Mason v. Mallard Tel. Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932).
128 See Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (App. Ct. 1930).
128 See Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121 N.E.2d 622 (1954).
Igo See Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 A. 391 (1929).
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such as an option, against the new holder."' Since the relief needed will de-
pend on the manner and extent that the parties have acted and the restriction
involved in each case, the general provision for enforcement adopted here is
preferable.
Second, the statute provides that restrictions may be enforced against
only the holder or his successor or transferee. It does not provide for enforce-
ment against prior holders 132 or the corporation. The reason for the restric-
tive application of the enforcement section is clear. In suits against prior
holders or the corporation the remedy sought would be damages, not enforce-
ment in the sense of an equitable remedy. Thus a suit against a prior holder
for transferring his securities in breach of the restriction would not be for spe-
cific enforcement of the restriction since the prior holder no longer has posses-
sion of the shares. An equitable remedy druid be obtained only in a suit
against the holder. Similarly, if the corporation or other individual is obligated
to purchase the shares and refuses to do so the holder would have an adequate
remedy at law—recovery of the difference between the sale price set by the
restriction and the market value of the shares. 133 The intent of the legislature,
therefore, was to specify the persons who, in equity, will have a duty to re-
store the shares to those whom the restrictions protect. Beyond this the legis-
lature is silent. The silence as to enforcement rights where a legal remedy is
sought should not be taken to mean that there is no legal right to enforce.
The legislature has not concerned itself with these situations but, instead, left
the whole question of rights and remedies at law to the courts.
This approach creates serious problems, however. The statute does not
say that the four types of restrictions enumerated in subsection (c) are
lawful, nor does it say that restrictions lawful at common law are lawful under
section 202. Instead the statute states that all these restrictions are "permitted
by this section," and in subsection (a) that restrictions permitted by this
section may be enforced against certain persons. Since no enforcement rights
are provided where legal remedies are sought, there is no indication whether
per se rules or the balancing test should be used to determine the validity of
a restriction in a suit for damages. This deficiency is particularly acute in
relation to the obligation to purchase restriction. That restriction is permitted
under section 202, but, since enforcement would not be sought against a
person enumerated in subsection (a), there is no remedy for the per se rule
adopted.
It is not likely that the legislature intended to create a per se rule with
regard to a type of restriction and then go on to make it inapplicable by
providing no right of enforcement. The legislative intent was probably to
make the restrictions permitted under subsection (c) "lawful." That is, the
words "permitted by this section" were intended to mean "lawful," even
131 See Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951).
132 The statute should be read to use the Code definition of holder. Under this
definition, a holder is the person to whom the stock is endorsed and who has possession
of the stock. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(20). Since the prior holder has trans-
ferred the stock and no longer has possession, he does not fit this definition.
133 See Reiman v. Northern Zaleski Ltd., 207 Misc. 351, 138 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
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though they appear to mean something less. Yet it is still difficult to under-
stand why the legislature adopted the unusual phrasing of section 202, when
it was easy for them to state that the subsection (c) and (e) restrictions
are lawful.
The final question arising under the enforcement section.
 involves the
persons against whom the restrictions may be enforced. The basic provision
of the statute is to allow enforcement against the holder. Section 201 of the
Delaware Corporation Law states that, unless otherwise provided, the Uni-
form Commercial Code, Article 8 shall regulate stock transfers. The Code
defines holder as one who is in possession of a security specifically indorsed
to him or to his order, or that is indorsed to bearer or in blank. 134 In addition
to the holder, section 202 provides enforcement against a transferee or suc-
cessor of the holder, including, among others, administrators, executors, guard-
ians and trustees. Although the enumeration of certain transferees and
successors may add some clarity, the meaning of the term transferee is not free
from ambiguity. Clearly, a transferee is one who receives the stock through a
transfer, but the word transfer is not specifically defined, either in this section,
or in the Code. Since most transfers involve indorsement to the transferee and
transfer of possession, making the transferee a holder subject to the enforce-
ment provisions, there is no problem in most cases. There is one common
transaction, however, in which the interest created may not be that of a
holder. This is the creation of a security interest in the shares. To determine
whether the secured party is bound by the restriction, therefore, the question
of whether the creation of a security interest is a transfer must be answered.
Although the Code does not define transfer, it does, in section 9-311,
specifically use the word in conjunction with the creation of a security interest.
Similarly, Section 159 of the Delaware Corporation Law refers to a transfer
made for collateral security and not absolutely. It is submitted, therefore,
that the word transfer as used in section 202 includes the creation of a security
interest, so that if there is a restriction, its terms must be complied with before
a valid security interest can be created. 135
 This result is an extension of the
common law, which generally did not require compliance with restrictions
until there was a transfer, or attempted transfer, of title and possession in
satisfaction of the underlying debt. 136
 The extended provision of section 202
would seem to be beneficial, since the debtor may assign his voting rights on
the books of the corporation to the secured party and the secured party only
is thereafter empowered to vote the stock. 137
The enforcement provisions, although limited in scope to situations
where equitable remedies would be given, permits enforcement against suffi-
cient individuals so that realistic protection is available to the corporation
254
 Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(20).
135 See Note, Restrictions on Stock Transfer, 63 Dick. L. Rev. 265, 268-69 (1950).
135
 Weissman v. Lincoln Corp., 76 So. 2d 478, 482-83 (Fla. 1954); Good Fellows
Assoc. v. Silverman, 283 Mass. 173, 181, 186 N.E. 48, 50 (1933). Under the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act such a result would seem mandatory since transfer is defined only
as transfer of legal title. Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 22(I).
137
 Under the Code, a pledge is the only permissible method of perfecting a
security interest in securities. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-304(1). Del. Corp. Law
§ 217(a) specifically allows assignment of voting rights to a pledgee.
426
STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
and its shareholders. In addition, they leave the courts free to fashion the
remedy to the particular facts in each case without the burden of inflexible
and often inappropriate rules. The only major difficulty with the provision is
the conflict between the permitted restrictions of subsection (c) and the
enforcement section when legal remedies are sought. The uncertainty of
the test to be applied in determining legal remedies and the validity of the
obligation to purchase restriction could have been avoided by providing
that the restrictions of subsection (c) were "lawful" rather than "permitted
by this section."
IV. REPEAL AND AMENDMENT OF RESTRICTIONS
Section 202 provides for the imposition and enforcement of stock
transfer restrictions, but does not provide for repeal and amendment. Pre-
sumably, then, repeal and amendment of restrictions is governed by section
242 which provides that the articles of incorporation may be amended by a
two-thirds vote of the shares, or by section 109 which provides that the by-
laws may be amended or repealed by the shareholders or, if given the power
in the articles of incorporation, by the board of directors. Most courts faced
with the question of whether the normal requirements of amendment and
repeal are applicable to stock transfer restrictions have held, however, that
since restrictions create personal rights they cannot be treated as ordinary
by-law or article of incorporation provisions. 138 These courts require the unan-
imous consent of all interested parties to amend or repeal restrictive pro-
visions. 139
It is submitted that in Delaware this approach is not correct at least
to the question of repeal. First, the basic arguments for such a rule are no
longer accepted. The theory that shareholders have immutable personal or
vested rights accompanying the shares has been discarded by the courts.'"
Nor is the fact that stockholders may have relied on the protection of the
restriction a valid reason for adopting a unanimity requirement since that
reliance must be qualified by the knowledge that the corporation law pro-
vides for amendment or repeal of the by-laws or articles of incorporation by
less than unanimous consent. 14 " Second, this approach is not consistent with
the Delaware statutory scheme. Nowhere in the statute is there a mandate
to adopt special requirements with respect to the repeal of stock transfer
restrictions. The weight of the absence of a provision is strengthened by the
fact that when the legislature did not wish to follow the statutory voting
standards when dealing with the imposition of restrictions on issued shares,
it specifically provided for unanimous vote of the outstanding shares.'"
138 See Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951) ; Loch
v. Paola Farmers Union, 130 Kan. 522, 287 P. 269 (1930) ; Johnson v. Tribune-Herald
Co., 155 Ga. 204, 166 S.E. 810 (1923). Contra, Silva v. Coastal Plywood & Timber Co.,
124 Cal. App. 2d 276, 268 P.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1954).
139 Cases cited note 138 supra.
140 Cf. Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights? 23 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 283, 291-92 (1958) ; see 14 Sw. L.J. 106, 108 (1960).
141 Cf. Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 333-34, 11 A.2d 331,
338 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; In re Int'I Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358, 360, 92 A. 255, 256 (1914).
142 Del. Corp. Law 202(b).
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Finally, it should be kept in mind that repeal promotes free alienability of
shares. To require unanimous consent would be to allow one shareholder to
block an attempt at free alienability when, in all likelihood, there is no
longer a valid corporate purpose to be served. It is submitted, therefore, that
repeal should be permitted by meeting only the general voting requirements
of the Corporation Law.
Amendment, however, presents a different problem. When a stock transfer
restriction is amended, not repealed, there is still a restriction on the securities.
Moreover, it is a restriction in a different form than the one originally
assented to by the shareholders. When the price of a first option is altered
or changes are made in the persons or classes of persons prohibited from
purchasing the shares, there is, in effect, a new restriction being imposed. It
is submitted that amendments, which require the imposition of a changed
restriction, fall within the statutory requirement of subsection (b) that
any restriction imposed on issued shares requires the unanimous consent
of the outstanding shares.
V. CoNcuusioN
The new approach taken by the Delaware Legislature to the problems
created by the use of stock transfer restrictions is, on the whole, an improve-
ment over past legislation in this area. The most significant change made
by the statute is the establishment of certain restrictions as valid per se. The
stability acquired by establishing per se rules in this area more than offsets
any undesirable increase in restraints on alienation. It is doubtful, however,
that any benefit that may be derived from the Subchapter S provision is
sufficient to offset the problems created by its inclusion. At the same time,
some provisions should be added to the section, specifically provisions dealing
with permissible legal remedies, repeal, amendment, options to purchase at
times other than at the time of an attempted transfer, and a provision for
reevaluation of restrictions adopted prior to the enactment of this statute by
less than unanimous consent of the outstanding shareholders. Also, the lan-
guage used in the statute raises some interpretation problems, especially the
use of the phrase "permitted by this section." Nevertheless, the section
adopted here presents a substantial improvement over the common law and
prior legislation in this area, and its approach should be considered by other
states in the future.
ROBERT L. REED
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